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Abstract7
When individuals learn from what others tell them, the information is subject to transmission8
error that does not arise in learning from direct experience. Yet evidence shows that humans9
consistently prefer this apparently more unreliable source of information. We examine the effect10
this preference has in cases where the information concerns a judgment on others’ behaviour and is11
used to establish cooperation in a society. We present a spatial model confirming that cooperation12
can be sustained by gossip containing a high degree of uncertainty. Accuracy alone does not13
predict the value of information in evolutionary terms; relevance, the impact of information on14
behavioural outcomes, must also be considered. We then show that once relevance is incorporated15
as a criterion, second-hand information can no longer be discounted on the basis of its poor fidelity16
alone. Finally we show that the relative importance of accuracy and relevance depends on factors17
of life history and demography.18
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1 Introduction20
A cooperative society is defined as one in which individuals benefit from the collective absence of21
defection (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). For any individual member defection is advantageous only if22
it is the exception. An example of cooperation is free trade between nations (Schelling, 1960). Against23
a context of free trade any one nation will benefit by introducing import tariffs but if all do so, all24
lose (Hardin, 1968). This paradox makes cooperation vulnerable, thus the discovery of cooperation in25
many different animal societies is surprising. Evolution depends on the relative fitness of individuals26
so we might expect individuals to maximize this regardless of its consequences for the group (Williams,27
1966; Dawkins, 1976). The existence of cooperation under such conditions can be explained by direct28
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971): if interactions in the society are between those who have met before and29
will meet again, a you-scratch-my-back rule between pairs results in a society which meets the criteria30
for cooperation. However cooperation also exists in societies such as contemporary urban ones, where31
populations are large and mobile and interactions are between strangers that are unlikely to meet again.32
Here direct reciprocity fails as an explanation, as the society is vulnerable to free-riders—individuals33
who defect opportunistically and move on before the consequences of their behaviour can catch up34
with them (Enquist and Leimar, 1993). Although such lifestyles of course have their own costs and35
benefits (Taylor, 2014), in such cases a different mechanism is typically used to explain cooperation.36
Indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 2005) is a system in which agents37
do good to one other because they are likely to receive good from a different other. One way this can38
be achieved is when individuals observe each other’s behaviour and pass on the resulting reputation39
in social transmission—gossip. Defectors can no longer free ride; however mobile they are they risk40
being preceded in their interactions by their reputation (Milinski et al., 2006).41
In relationships based on direct reciprocation we can imagine that it is quite possible for an in-42
dividual to form a judgment of the quality of a partner because the history of previous interactions43
provides its own guarantee. But in order for a system of indirect reciprocity to hold, a similar quality of44
information is required of partners who have never met before (McElreath and Boyd, 2007). Requiring45
a reputation to achieve indirect reciprocity places greater demands on it (Roberts, 2008). Whereas46
direct reciprocity requires memory of previous experience of direct perception, here the information is47
a temporally and spatially displaced judgment determined and passed on by others and as such po-48
tentially more vulnerable to error. In this article, we focus on the question of how gossip can support49
cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005) despite this potential for inaccuracy.50
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In cases where the reputation of a partner is learnt third-hand via social transmission of information51
(gossip) the reliability of that information is paramount. We might expect individuals to be very52
sensitive to any evidence of error in the information. However a number of researchers have shown53
that our behaviour contradicts this expectation. Human societies continue to be trusting of socially54
learned information even when it is known to contain much error and uncertainty (Richerson and55
Boyd, 2005; Hess and Hagen, 2006). What is more, when faced with the direct evidence of our senses56
contradicting social learning we often give preference to the latter (Asch, 1956) even when based on57
anonymous gossip (Sommerfeld et al., 2007). Comparisons of human and non-human cognitive abilities58
(Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten et al., 2009) cite humans’ greater use of culture—which is founded on social59
learning—as our key advantage (Gergely and Csibra, 2006; Henrich and McElreath, 2003; Tomasello,60
1999). Human infants when taught to perform a task in an inefficient manner persist in it despite61
exposure to a better alternative (Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1988), while other primates imitate62
only necessary actions once some demonstrated actions are recognised as unnecessary (Whiten et al.,63
2009). In this article we present a possible explanation for the human propensity to over-imitate, by64
analysing the information in gossip relative to information from direct experience.65
Humans intuitively value accuracy in information and have a variety of methods to assess it. We66
assign lower value to information that is contradictory, or that differs from an authoritative source.67
Scott-Phillips (2008) argues that in nature information should be defined in evolutionary terms. But68
evolution does not access the accuracy of information directly, it acts on the results of the information69
being put to use (Rauwolf et al., 2015). This has the effect of introducing relevance (Dessalles, 2007;70
Sperber and Wilson, 1995) as a crucial component of information value. We define relevant information71
as information that is needed to perform the task at hand. Information that is highly accurate but72
unlikely to be put to use will therefore have less value. Non-relevant information will not be acted73
upon, and therefore will not be subject to selection pressures, whether it is accurate or inaccurate.74
When individuals rely on experience, we assume accuracy is not in question but the relevance75
of what they learn is dictated by the limits of the life history of the individual concerned (Cˇacˇe76
and Bryson, 2007; Roberts, 2008). In the case we examine—the role of reputational information in77
successive interactions—the information in question can only be put to use when an individual meets78
the same individual again and the consequences of reputation gained earlier are realized. The notion79
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of relevance in this context is captured by the cost / benefit relationship in the following equation:80
c < wb (1)
where w is the probability of future interactions, c is the cost incurred at the first interaction, and b81
is the benefit expected from that cost in any future interactions (Roberts, 2008). When an individual82
learns by social communication, relevance is likely to be higher as social transmission decouples the83
information from full dependence on physical experience. In the limit case of instant communication,84
w = 1, agents can be sure to know the most recent social actions of any individual they meet. This85
does not mean that social information is always of relevance to the audience of gossip, but that86
on the occasions when an interaction is influenced by the reputation of an agent there is a higher87
probability of benefit from information if it is socially transmitted than if it must be learnt through88
individual experience. This is because it is more likely that others may have had recent (or indeed89
any) experience of the interactor. However in freeing information about interactions from spatial and90
temporal constraints, socially transmitted information may incur a cost due to loss of accuracy. We91
are agnostic here as to whether error is introduced deliberately or by misperception; we only assume92
that error accumulates over the process of repeated transmission. We can again describe a necessary93
relationship:94
q < wb/c (2)
where q is the probability of the reputational information being correct. That is, the expected future95
benefit must outweigh the cost of the interaction by a sufficient extent to compensate for the probability96
of miscommunication.97
In a series of three experiments we explore the effect of incorporating both relevance and accu-98
racy in the evaluation of information learned by direct experience or by social communication. First99
we replicate in a spatial simulation the mathematic result of Nakamura and Masuda (2011). This100
demonstrates that in the full social communication case (w = 1) reputational information can sustain101
cooperation despite containing a large degree of uncertainty caused by assigning others reputations102
based on incomplete observation. In Experiment 2 we relax the (w = 1) assumption by parameteriz-103
ing the rate of spread of social information, and substituting low transmission fidelity for incomplete104
observation as the cause of error. We show that accuracy alone cannot predict the ability of social105
communication to sustain cooperation. A level of accuracy too low to sustain cooperation at a lower106
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rate of transmission is nevertheless able to do so if the transmission rate is increased. In the third107
experiment we replace control of transmission rate with the assumption of a limited lifespan for agents.108
We compare the performance of individuals that learn from direct experience with those that use so-109
cial communication. A limited lifespan means that reputational information is liable to be outdated110
and thus of lower relevance. But as the direct experience strategy can be more vulnerable in this111
respect we again show that accuracy alone cannot predict the outcome. A gossiping strategy which is112
ruled out by its high level of error under conditions of long or unlimited lifespan may still outperform113
experience-based learning if lifespans are shorter. Our conclusion is that the relative merits of rele-114
vance and accuracy are highly sensitive to the ecology of the society. Adhering to a gossiping strategy115
despite the potential inaccuracy of the information can thus be evolutionarily successful under many116
conditions.117
2 Methods118
Model119
All experiments are based on the same agent-based model of evolutionary game theory. Interaction120
between individuals following different strategies and influenced by different kinds of information gen-121
erates varying payoffs which are used to evolve the population.122
Individual Interactions: the Donation Game123
Following the method used by Nakamura and Masuda (2011), agents in our simulation play the dona-124
tion game, which is similar in form to the prisoner’s dilemma (See Figure 1). The idea of the game125
is based on ordinary social interactions, where an individual can choose to help a passing stranger126
or not, for example by giving directions. Individuals move at random in a two-dimensional world at127
each iteration. The world is a 21 x 21 torus which wraps horizontally and vertically. If two agents are128
located adjacently, roles for the game are assigned randomly and they are able to interact by playing129
a move in the game. The game has two players: a donor and a recipient. There are two possible130
moves in the game. If the donor cooperates, it pays cost c and the recipient gains benefit b. If the131
donor defects it pays nothing and the recipient gains nothing. In cases where 0 < c < b the dilemma132
of cooperation described in the introduction is created: in a single interaction the best move for the133
6
Figure 1: The donation game involves three actors: a donor who chooses whether or not to donate to
a recipient, and an observer. Where a donation occurs, the donor pays c and the recipient receives b.
The observer updates its own record of the donor’s reputation both on the basis of the donor’s action,
and possibly on the reputation the observer holds for the recipient (see main text and Table 1.)
Table 1: Social norm used in experiments 2 and 3. The second-order judging norm.
Good Bad
Cooperate G B
Defect B G
donor is to defect, but each individual does better if all cooperate.134
Reputation Assigned by Observers According to a Social Norm135
Individuals have binary reputation values: Good or Bad. The observer updates the donor’s reputation136
based on a combination of the donor’s action: Cooperate or Defect, and the recipient’s reputation137
according to a single model-wide rule called the social norm. Here we use the judging norm (Nakamura138
and Masuda, 2011; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006, see Table 1). This specifies a society which approves of139
those who cooperate (C) with the good (G) and defect (D) against the bad (B). Each individual has140
its own record of others’ reputations. Individuals meet at random and update each other’s records so141
that reputation spreads. For a discussion of other possible norms and their effects on donation games,142
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see Rauwolf et al. (2015).143
Reputation Impacts on Individual Choice of Action144
The donors’ choice of action is determined by their action rule (Nakamura and Masuda, 2011). There145
are 3 populations each acting according to a different rule: unconditional cooperators (ALLC agents)146
cooperate regardless of their parter’s reputation; unconditional defectors (ALLD agents) defect regard-147
less of their partner’s reputation, and discriminators (DISC agents) cooperate with partners who are148
good but defect against bad partners (Ohtsuki et al., 2009).149
Evolution According to Payoff150
The population is reproduced according to fitness-proportionate selection (Goldberg and Deb, 1991)151
based on pay-offs from the donation game. Mutation, in which an action rule different to the parent’s152
is substituted in offspring, occurs according to a probability (see Table 2).153
Experiment 1. Judgments Made Without Full Knowledge154
It can be seen from Table 1 that the observer’s assignment of reputation to a donor is a second-order155
judgement. It is determined by a combination of the donor’s action with the recipient’s reputation.156
Nakamura and Masuda (2011) introduce uncertainty in the second term, so that a proportion of donors157
take part in and are judged on interactions with recipients of unknown reputation. The authors158
identify three social norms which are still able to realize indirect reciprocity under this condition. We159
replicate this in the case of a single norm—the suspicious judging norm—since rather than considering160
the relative performance of different norms we are interested in the extent to which a given norm161
can continue to function under conditions of unreliable information. We choose the suspicious norm162
motivated by the finding in Yoo (2009) that negative gossip has a greater impact on the listener.163
Method164
The donor and observer only know the reputation of the recipient with probability 0 < k < 1. This165
is concomitant: all agents share the same information, so either they both know or neither do. In166
view of this the action rules are extended. ALLC agents here also cooperate (C) with partners whose167
actual reputation is unknown (U) to them. ALLD agents defect (D) against unknown partners. DISC168
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agents cooperate with unknown (U) partners. The social norm is also extended (see Table 2). Players169
who cooperate with unknown partners are judged good (G) but those who defect against an unknown170
partner are judged bad (B). This norm is termed suspicious because faced with an agent who defects171
against a partner unknown to him observers have a choice of two assumptions. The trusting assumption172
is that he defects because the unknown agent is in fact bad. The suspicious one is that he defects173
despite the fact that his partner is in reality good.174
Simulation175
In each round, two randomly selected agents are assigned the roles donor and recipient and play the176
donation game. Payoffs to both players are determined according to the rules of the game described177
above. To begin by considering the most extreme case (this will be refined below), reputation is spread178
instantly and with perfect transmission fidelity to all agents resulting in a single global reputation for179
each agent which is then used to play the next round of donation game. An assumed observer updates180
the donor’s reputation in the list held by all agents according to the social norm described above. The181
list records each agent as either good or bad1. Rounds are repeated until every agent has played once182
against every other. We call this one generation. At the end of each generation the sum of all the183
costs and benefits to each agent are calculated.184
A generation is followed by a round of reproduction. The strategy of each agent is encoded in a185
genome of one position with three alleles. Each member of the new generation is selected from the186
previous generation according to fitness-proportionate selection. The chance of selecting individual i187
is pi/(
n∑
j=1
pj), that is the payoff of individual i divided by the total pay-off of the population. There188
is also a small chance for mutation u = 0.01, where an agent’s strategy is replaced by one of the three189
available strategies. At the start of the run the population is made up entirely of DISC agents. This190
process iterates 2000 times to provide ALLD and ALLC sufficient opportunity to invade DISC from191
scarcity.192
193
194
1In experiments 2 and 3, global reputation is replaced by peer-to-peer gossip and individual memory in order provide
a setting in which claims made about cheap communication can be examined.
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Table 2: The suspicious social norm, which is used in Experiment 1. The judging norm is extended
to include a first-order norm in cases where the recipient’s reputation is unknown. The norm assumes
that when a donor plays Defect against a partner with unknown reputation he is playing Defect to
a Good partner, hence is suspicious of him, rather than the alternative possibility that he is playing
Defect because his partner’s reputation is Bad.
Good Bad Unknown
Cooperate G B G
Defect B G B
Table 3: Table of free parameters, values used in present figures, and a sensitivity report including
range of values tested.
Sym-
bol
Parameter Value Notes
n population
size
100 number of agents.
r rounds 10,000 donation games per generation.
g generations 5,000 number of evolutionary iterations.
c cost 1 cost of cooperating, kept constant.
b benefit [1,10] benefit of being recipient of cooperating donor, increments of
0.25
u mutation rate 0.01 chance of strategy mutation.
k knowledge [0,1] probability recipient’s reputation known, increments of 0.025
Results and Discussion195
In the unshaded parameter region in Figure 2 interactions are entirely cooperative. A population which196
is predominantly DISC in the context of these parameter ranges and the suspicious judging social norm197
produces a society where interactions are overwhelmingly cooperative (C). The result is consistent with198
that of Nakamura and Masuda (2011). Cooperation is stable against invasion down to low values of k199
provided that the cost/benefit ratio is high. Conversely in regions where the cost/benefit ratio is low200
a higher value of k is required to enable cooperation.201
These results suggest that within a specified context of action rules and social norms cooperation can202
persist in a society even when a significant amount of the information used to enforce the cooperation is203
uncertain. The assumption of trust specifies a cooperative action from the donor when the recipient’s204
reputation is unknown (Nakamura and Masuda, 2011). This means that a certain proportion of205
recipients whose actual reputation is Bad will escape the punishment. That cooperators are able to206
overcome such limitations on observation demonstrates that it can be in an individual’s interest both207
to tolerate being judged and to judge others, even in this imperfect fashion.208
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Figure 2: Judgments made without full knowledge. Percentage of cooperative interactions aggregated
over 10 runs. In the unshaded parameter region interactions are cooperative. Dark cells indicate that
at 2000 generations DISC is invaded by ALLD.
b
Experiment 2. Agents’ Knowledge of Reputations Differs Ac-209
cording to the Spread of Gossip210
In Experiment 1 the information carried by gossip was sometimes incorrect at the source but there was211
no error in gossip transmission. But wee know that in the real world, knowledge and behaviour take212
time to diffuse through a population (Gruber et al., 2015). Here we investigate error in transmission213
and the speed at which information is spread. We replace the idealized broadcast transmission of Naka-214
mura and Masuda (2011) with a more ecologically plausible spatial model of peer-to-peer interactions215
occurring during encounters between mobile agents.216
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Method217
Agents interact when they are in sufficient proximity to each other. Specifically the world is an218
21x21 grid, and agents interact on each cycle with at most one other agent, if one is present on an219
adjacent grid cell. After playing a round of the donation game the partners exchange information.220
This communication takes place regardless of the nature of the interaction that has just taken place.221
If one agent believes a third party to be bad, and the other believes it to be good, then the agent with222
the ‘good’ association updates this instead to ‘bad’. We use this pessimistic rule to represent a society223
in which reputation is difficult to achieve but easy to lose.224
In Experiment 2, the explicit probability used in Experiment 1 (1 − k) that a recipient in an225
observed game may be unknown (U) is replaced by the emergent chance that information about a226
player’s reputation may not have spread sufficiently fast to inform the donor or observer in their next227
interaction. All agents are initially assigned a good reputation, we examine how efficiently evidence228
of infringed reputation is spread. Therefore, agents no longer require individual behaviour rules for229
handling unknown (U) individuals. The probability of information being up-to-date is a function of230
the agents’ collective behaviour. The rate at which gossip spreads is a function of a limit t placed on231
the number of individuals whose reputations may be exchanged at each encounter, see Table 2. This232
limit combined with the absence of a global reputation means that agents do not know each other’s233
knowledge state and therefore cannot selectively divulge full information. Rather, agents communicate234
a random set of their own knowledge. Note that it is possible for the gossip to have reached the donor235
but not the observer or vice versa. This type of observation is known as independent, in contrast to236
Experiment 1 where due to the use of broadcast reputation observation was concomitant.237
An error rate e specifies the probability that at each exchange of gossip the opposite update to the238
one intended is made by the recipient (see Table 2.) Populations of the three strategies (ALLC, ALLD,239
DISC) are of equal size throughout Experiment 2. There is no reproduction, selection or mutation.240
The relative performance of strategies is judged on their average pay-off from the donation game241
242
Results and Discussion243
Figure 3 shows that minimum values of both transmission rate and accuracy are required in order for244
DISC to out-perform ALLC and ALLD. However within this context there is an interplay between the245
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Table 4: Table of free parameters, values used in figure 3, including range of values tested.
Sym-
bol
Parameter Value Notes
n population
size
150 number of agents.
r rounds 1,000 spatial model so number of interactions per round varies
c cost 1 cost of cooperating, kept constant.
b benefit 3 benefit from being recipient of cooperating donor, kept
constant
e error [0,
100]
per cent chance incorrect transmission of reputation
t transmission [0,
100]
percentage of population gossiped about at each encounter.
two parameters. A level of accuracy poor enough to cause DISC to fail at low transmission rates is246
nevertheless sufficient to make the DISC the winning strategy once transmission rate is raised.247
When accuracy and relevance are both factors in the value of information, socially-learned infor-248
mation even with a high incidence of error may outperform experience-based learning if the latter249
is insufficiently relevant (Sommerfeld et al., 2007). By parameterizing the rate at which information250
spreads, we are able to examine the interaction between relevance and accuracy. Although relevance is251
not directly controlled in our agent-based model, as transmission rate increases so does the probability252
of having reputational information concerning an individual that an agent is interacting with. The253
risk of being updated by inaccurate information is outweighed by the risk that not being updated will254
cause greater inaccuracy.255
Formal analysis of an ALLD agent’s reputation256
To better understand how transmission and error rate affect the performance of each strategy, we turn257
to formal analysis. Cooperation is maintained by eliminating free-riders, and this is only accomplished258
if free-riders are negatively reputed. Here we analyse the probability, ALLDb, that an ALLD is259
considered bad.260
To do this formally, we presume a few simplifications. Gossip and the spread of social information261
inherently rely on the specifics of a social network. If an individual sees one person more than another,262
they are more likely to receive information from that person. While computer simulations easily permit263
spatial and network dependencies, here we focus on elucidating the interplay between transmission and264
error rate. In doing this, the nuances of a particular social network are abstracted away. However, as265
a consequence we slightly alter the definition of error rate and transmission rate.266
13
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Accuracy
Tr
a
n
sm
is
si
on
 R
at
e
0
2
4
6
8
10
N
um
be
r R
un
s 
wh
er
e 
DI
SC
 s
co
re
d 
Hi
gh
es
t P
ay
o
ff
Figure 3: Experiment 2, in which agents’ knowledge of reputation differs as a result of the spread of
knowledge. Simulation results are shown for a range of error rates in transmission (e), and rates of
transmission (t), aggregated over 10 runs. In the light region DISC scores a higher payoff than both
ALLC and ALLD.
When an agent uncovers a free-rider, it attempts to pass on this information through gossip. We267
define transmission rate, t′, as the probability an agent will hear the newly discovered information268
during a round of play. Previously, transmission rate was defined as the chance that two interacting269
agents would gossip about another agent. The gossip could then be passed to other agents at some later270
interaction. However, the fact that these simulations are spatial—that is, each agent has a location and271
this determines which agents they interact with—has consequences. While transmission of gossip relies272
on whether or not a bit of information is discussed, it also relies on the probability of interacting with273
other agents with relevant knowledge. This is correlated with location. Here we define transmission274
rate to encapsulate both space and the chance to spread gossip. t′ is the chance that, in any round,275
an agent will hear a specific piece of gossip.276
When an agent hears gossip there is a chance it will be in error. e′, is the chance communication277
is erroneous. Again, this is slightly different compared to the error rate employed in the computer278
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Figure 4: The probability ALLDb that an agent has heard that a particular ALLD agent is bad, after
(a) one and (b) ten rounds of play. Mathematical outcomes are shown for a range of error rates in
transmission (e′) and rates of transmission (t′).
simulations. Previously, error rate represented the chance that at a given communication was incorrect.279
Here we presume that whenever an agent hears information, there is an 1− e′ chance that it is correct.280
If gossip travelled instantaneously, then 1−e′ fraction of agents would correctly diagnose the defec-281
tor. However, information does not spread instantaneously, it depends on the speed of transmission.282
So, if an agent discovers a defector, the chance this information will accurately reach another agent in283
a given round is:284
ALLDb = (1 − e′)t′ (3)
An ALLD is marked as bad if the agent receives the information, t′, and the information is correct,285
1 − e′. Furthermore, the probability that an agent will accurately hear the gossip after i rounds can286
be written as:287
ALLDb = (1 − e′)(1 − (1 − t′)i) (4)
There is a 1−t′ chance that an agent does not hear the information in a given round. Consequently,288
there is a (1 − t′)i chance that an agent has not heard the information after i rounds. 1 − (1 − t′)i is289
then the probability that an agent has heard the information in i rounds. This result is then multiplied290
by the probability that the information is accurate, 1 − e′.291
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Results and Discussion292
A parameter sweep of e′ [0, 1] and t′ [0, 1] can be plugged into Equation 4 to calculate the likelihood293
than an ALLD agent is given a bad reputation, ALLDb. Figure 4(a) shows ALLDb after one round294
of gossip. Clearly, ALLDb depends on the interplay between the transmission and error rate. As the295
transmission rate increases, so does the likelihood of speedily informing others. However, the accuracy296
of the transmission is limited by the error in communication.297
Figure 4(b) shows the percentage of negatively reputed ALLD agents after 10 rounds of gossip.298
As time passes, the effects of the transmission rate diminish. After ten rounds, an agent inhabiting a299
relatively low-error-rate world is likely to have heard the information, regardless the transmission rate.300
Only very small levels of t′ show a marked difference.301
However, whilst the effect of the transmission rate may become moot after several rounds, cooper-302
ation might not last that long. If an ALLD is permitted to operate with a good reputation for multiple303
rounds, then it might undermine a cooperative society long before future rounds can be played. This is304
why, in Figure 2, the strategy with the highest pay-off depends on the rate of transmission. Expedited305
and relevant information dissemination reduces the opportunity for free-riding, increasing the pay-offs306
of DISC agents.307
Experiment 3. Personal Experience Versus Gossip Under Lim-308
ited Lifespan309
In Experiment 2 the value of information about reputations did not degrade over time. The information310
an individual has may be incorrect either because of transmission error or because restriction on the311
transmission rate prevents incorrect information from being updated. But there is another way in312
which information could be false which was not considered: that is, in the time since the information313
originated the object of its reference may have changed. Here we revoke this assumption and give314
the value of the reputational information a time limit. Information that was originally relevant may315
subsequently become irrelevant when the state of affairs it applies to has changed. We do this by316
imposing a limited lifespan on the agents, affecting both the individuals that carry information and317
the individuals that the information refers to.318
319
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Table 5: Table of free parameters, values used in Figures 5 and 6, and values tested.
Sym-
bol
Parameter Value Notes
n population
size
200 number of agents.
r rounds 5,000 spatial model so number of interactions per round varies
e error [0.7] per cent chance incorrect transmission of reputation
l lifespan [3000,
10000]
at initiation each individual’s life set at random random
between 0 and this upper limit
Method320
In this simulation we compare two strategies: Direct Observers and Gossipers. Direct Observers do321
not transmit gossip and do not receive it. Their only source of information is their own observations.322
Here we assume that observer’s information on others’ reputations is perfectly accurate, being based323
on their own (perfect) perception, and not subject to transmission error e. This assumption is the limit324
case, giving the observers the maximum advantage of their strategy. In contrast, Gossipers transmit325
and receive gossip about others’ reputations. The accuracy of their information is affected by the value326
of e and the number of gossiping interactions that the information has crossed.327
We introduce a lifespan value l that determines the maximum number of rounds an agent lives.328
Whether lifespan is a genetically regulated trait is a matter of some controversy, lifespan is a common329
feature used to characterise species, and from a theoretical perspective it has known impacts (Kokko,330
1997; Cˇacˇe and Bryson, 2007). At the beginning of a simulation, each agent is randomly assigned an331
age within the lifespan. After each round the lifespan reduces by 1. When an agent reaches the end of332
its life it is deleted. Dead agents are replaced by new agents which possess no information from either333
gossip or observation. Other agents in turn have no information from direct observation or gossip334
regarding the reputation of new agents.335
As in Experiment 2 at the start of the run agents’ reputations are set to good (G) and gossip consists336
of setting good (G) to bad (B) only. This provides a simple rule for which agent takes precedence in337
information exchanges. As in Experiment 2, populations of all six strategies are of equal size. Note338
that as in Experiment 2 there is no selection or mutation, even though there is reproduction. New339
agents are identical clones of their parent to limit the experiment to testing the effect of irrelevance340
generated by agent turnover. The relative performance of Direct Observation versus Gossip is judged341
on the extent to which each population has assigned bad reputations (B) to ALLD (defector) agents.342
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Figure 5: Direct Observation versus Gossip under a longer lifespan, l = 10000, e = 0.7, the presence
of an error rate in gossip means that over time it can be outperformed by direct observation. Points
plotted are means with 95% confidence interval calculated over ten replications.
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Figure 6: Direct observation versus gossip under a shorter lifespan l = 3000). Despite a ceiling
determined by the error rate e = 0.7 here gossip can perform better than direct observation. This is
because knowledge from observation will on average be acquired on a lower number of individuals per
turn, therefore it suffers higher impact from the lower number of opportunities per lifetime. Thus the
error generated during social transmission does not necessarily entail that direct observation is a better
strategy. Points plotted are means with 95% confidence interval calculated over ten replications.
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Results and Discussion343
From Figure 5 it can be seen that, for the conditions of e and t in our experiments, gossiping individuals344
can initially learn more quickly than those that rely on personal experience. This is in keeping with the345
results demonstrated in Experiment 2. However transmission error acts as a ceiling on the maximum346
amount of knowledge acquired from gossip—after initial progress a stage is reached where updates347
are no longer improving on the information that an individual already holds. Learning by direct348
observation may be slower, but since it is not subject to transmission error it can eventually deliver a349
greater amount of information to each individual. However, this effect depends on lifespan which limits350
what one agent can discover. Figure 6 shows populations competing under the same conditions except351
for a shorter lifespan. Both strategies show a reduction in performance as a more changeable ecology352
places greater demands on information-gathering abilities and reduces the relevance of information353
held. However the two strategies do not degrade equally—for this set of parameters, the advantage of354
accuracy over relevance has been overturned. Gossiping individuals have access to more information355
as the error caused in transmission is outweighed by the speed advantage of gossip.356
When lifespan is limited, relevant reputational information levels are reduced in four ways:357
1. a record of reputation is useless when the individual it refers to no longer exists.358
2. when individuals die the information they carry dies with them.359
3. newborn individuals do not have a history of interactions on which their reputation can be based.360
4. newborn individuals when entering into an interaction do not have the benefit of a history of361
personal experience or gossip to draw on when choosing which move to play.362
If information spreads more quickly by gossip than it can by direct observation, then gossip meets363
these challenges more effectively, providing only that the rate of error is sufficiently low compared to364
the relative rate of transmission. We formalise this provision below, and show results over a larger365
range of parameters.366
Formal Analysis of Gossip versus Direct Observation367
The utility of gossip and experience can be formally analysed. By comparing the ability of Direct Ob-368
servers and Gossipers to negatively repute ALLD agents, we can analyse the contexts where Gossiping369
is a dominant strategy.370
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Figure 7: White represents the contexts where Gossipers diagnose more ALLD agents compared to
Direct Observers. Analysis is run over a parameter sweep of lifespan (l) and error rate (e). Because
lifespan does not scale with the size of the population, results vary with the latter. The number of
ALLD agents (Nd, held constant at 1/3N) in figures shown is (a) Nd = 50; (N = 150), and (b)
Nd = 500; (N = 1500).
What is the probability that a Direct Observer will negatively repute an ALLD agent? As before,371
each Direct Observer begins with the belief that all agents are good. It is only through experience that372
agents attribute bad reputation. We define l as the Direct Observer’s life expectancy. l denotes the373
number of agents it will meet during the course of its life. For simplicity and without loss of generality,374
we presume that at every interaction the agent meets a previously unmet agent, thus again maximising375
the benefit of the Direct Observation strategy. Therefore at the end of its life, the agent will have met376
l agents — one for each interaction.377
During an interaction, the agent will meet an ALLD with probability Pd, where Pd is the percentage378
of ALLD agents in the population. Since the agents are judging others by direct experience, we assume379
no error in the observation. By the end of its life these optimal Direct Observers will have correctly380
classified lPd ALLD agents as bad. The fraction of negatively reputed ALLD agents is this total381
divided by the number of ALLDs in the population. We define Nd as the number of ALLD agents in382
the population.383
We presume that at any given time the age of the agents are homogeneously spread between the384
range [1...l]. Thus, the average age of the population is l2 . If DOb is defined as the average fraction of385
negatively reputed ALLDs classified by Direct Observers, then it can be written as:386
DOb =
lPd
2Nd
(5)
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In contrast to Direct Observers, Gossipers help each other classify ALLDs. As a consequence,387
while still constrained by l, the Gossipers benefit from a multiplier t which is the number of individ-388
uals they learn about on each cycle. However, they must contend with the possibility of erroneous389
communication.390
Again for the benefit of simplicity, we assume a well-mixed population, such that in the first round,391
each ALLD is observed by at least one Gossiper. This also assumes that there are more Gossipers than392
ALLD, a safe assumption if half of the population is a Gossiper and a third ALLD. The Gossipers393
then relay the information to others. The likelihood that a Gossiper negatively reputes an ALLD394
is calculated as per Equation 4. The only undefined parameter from the equation is the number of395
rounds the agent has experienced, i. If each agent can experience l interactions in its lifetime, then, on396
average, a Gossiper will have experienced l2 interactions. i =
l
2 is then the average number of rounds397
the Gossiper has experienced. If Gb defines the chance that a Gossiper negatively reputes an ALLD,398
then:399
Gb = (1 − e′)(1 − (1 − t′) l2 ) (6)
(Note that (1 − t′) is raised to l2 , one half of lifespan.)400
Now we can calculate when Gossipers will diagnose more ALLD agents than Direct Observers.401
Namely, when is:402
Gb > DOb (7)
a somewhat complex relationship that depends on the interactions between e′, t′ and l403
e′ < 1 − lPd
2Nd ∗ (1 − (1 + t′)l/2) . (8)
Results and Discussion404
Figure 7 shows when Gossipers outperform Direct Observers for differing values of lifespan, l =405
[1, 1000], and error rate, e′ = [0, 1]. As in the computer model, 1/3 of the population is comprised406
of ALLD agents (i.e. Pd = 1/3). The transmission rate is held static at t
′ = 0.5. As explained in407
Experiment 2, because i = l/2, i is typically large enough that the transmission rate does not affect408
the fraction of negatively reputed ALLDs.409
Because Direct Observation relies on personal experience over a fixed lifespan, the winning strategy410
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is not only dependant on lifespan and error rate, but also on the absolute number of ALLD agents, which411
in this case scales with the size of the overall population. Figure 7(a) shows that direct observation412
is often the best strategy when there are fifty ALLD agents in a population of one hundred fifty.413
Even here, Gossipers can outperform Direct Observers if the accuracy of communication is sufficiently414
high and if the lifespan of the agents is fairly short. In contrast, Figure 7(b) illustrates that the415
Gossiping strategy is often preferred when there are five-hundred ALLD agents. Increasing the size of416
the population decreases the chance of the Direct Observer strategy prevailing. In contrast, the Direct417
Observer strategy does well when communication is highly erroneous or agents live a long time (cf.418
Equation 8).419
Direct Observer success depends on the number of ALLD agents because for total knowledge they420
must individually experience each agent. As the size of the population grows, the Direct Observer421
must spend much longer to categorize the same fraction of agents. In contrast, the Gossip strategy422
can more easily scale to growing populations. Because the entire population works together to uncover423
defectors, their success is much less perturbed by population growth. In summary, we have shown that424
the success of gossiping compared to direct observation is dependent not only on lifespan, the rate of425
communication and its fidelity, but also on the size of the population.426
3 General Discussion427
We have replicated in a spatial model the Nakamura and Masuda (2011) results and confirmed their428
analysis, that gossip is able to sustain cooperation even when the information transmitted contains a429
high degree of uncertainty. We propose an explanation for this: when assessing the value of information430
in an evolutionary context we must incorporate not only accuracy but also relevance. We tested this431
in an experiment which examined how transmission rate interacts with transmission error. We found432
that socially-learned information even with a high incidence of error may outperform experience-based433
learning if the individuals whose reputation is learned by the latter method are not the same as those434
the agent subsequently encounters. In this we made the assumption that gossip is always as fast as or435
faster than individual learning.436
Finally we have demonstrated that the relative importance of accuracy and relevance is highly437
sensitive to the ecology of the group, where by ‘ecology’ we mean demographic and life-history char-438
acteristics determining network diffusion properties. We do not argue that gossiping individuals will439
always outperform those that learn from direct experience. Our conclusion is that even if the incidence440
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of error in gossip is high, which is a reasonable assumption given that gossip is second-hand information441
and talk is cheap, this does not mean that gossip is necessarily an inferior source of information.442
A possible objection to this claim is that if changes in a society’s ecology increase the frequency443
of re-meeting between individuals then the scope to offset the error in gossip by its superior relevance444
is reduced and learning by experience might prove more reliable (Roberts, 2008). Equation 8 shows445
that in fact either technique may be preferred, depending also on the context of transmission rate,446
transmission fidelity and lifespan. Gossip could still be a means of defence against rogue individuals447
that travel further. Parochialism might be another defence, but this would also limit opportunities for448
beneficial exchange between communities (Abbink et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014).449
The potential for increasing the probability of re-meetings will also vary according to the interaction450
in question. Some types of interaction naturally take place very often during an individual’s lifespan,451
while others occur much less frequently. Hence as the results of Experiment 3 indicate, gossip may be452
more relevant for interactions that are infrequent in the context of an agent’s lifespan.453
Importantly, we have gone to lengths to give Direct Observation perhaps unreasonable levels of454
advantage in these simulations. In the case where perception of events was uncertain even for the455
immediate observer (as often occurs in human socialisation), then if transmission fidelity is higher456
than perception fidelity, it could be possible to improve the accuracy of information by combining457
information based on the perception of multiple sources (Fahle and Poggio, 1981; Moravec, 1988;458
Jacobs et al., 1991; Kao and Couzin, 2014). If for example learning by experience were to involve459
direct observation as opposed to having been directly involved in the exchange, then we are able to460
question the assumption that k = 1. This is true even for direct exchanges if the values of the costs461
and benefits are for any reason obscured to those involved, a condition common in both treaties and462
commerce.463
Note that our results do not impact on the issues faced in explaining cooperation per se, for example464
the objection that gossip itself assumes cooperation and that therefore using it to explain cooperation465
is a regress. Of course, the invasion of individually maladaptive but socially beneficial traits has466
been well explored and established elsewhere (e.g. Cˇacˇe and Bryson, 2007; Alizon and Taylor, 2008).467
However, our principle interest here is not so much to explain the ubiquitous presence of cooperation.468
Here we take gossip and cooperation as a setting in which we have addressed the claim that cheap,469
unreliable communication could not supplant more reliable direct observation.470
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4 Conclusion471
Intuitively we tend to value accurate sources of information over inaccurate ones. Under the influence472
of this intuition the evolution of socially-acquired information seems hard to explain as its accuracy473
is likely to be lower than information acquired by direct experience. We have shown that the value of474
an information source cannot be determined by its accuracy alone, relevance must also be taken into475
account. Once this is done it is possible to explain that despite even a high level of inaccuracy, an476
individual’s best information-gathering strategy may still be to depend on gossip.477
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